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 The U.S.-Japan alliance is the most important bilateral relationship in the world for international peace and security, yet it operates within two very 
different national legal systems. For decades, the alliance between Japan and 
the United States has underwritten political and economic development in East 
Asia, generating confidence and stability that impact the global system.1 Richard 
L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr. have described Japan accurately as “the most 
capable U.S. ally in the most important part of the world.”2 Situated astride the 
confluence of China, North Korea, and Russia, Japan makes a greater contribu-
tion to international peace and security than any nation other than the United 
States.3 In particular, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is the most 
professional, advanced, and capable conventional naval partner of the U.S. Navy.4
While the two states share values of dignity and human rights, individual and 
economic freedom, and a state system governed by the rule of law, they have dif-
ferent languages, cultures, and legal systems. These legal systems take distinct ap-
proaches to authorizing military operations and implementing the inherent right 
of self-defense under international law, and they vindicate these rights through 
dissimilar legal doctrines, decision-making pro-
cesses, and national command authorities.
This article explores how Japan and the United 
States manage and pursue the authorization for 
employment of military forces and the conduct 
of operations within their respective legal systems 
and how the two approaches converge within the 
alliance structure. Further, the article compares 
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how the United States and Japan develop and implement the international law 
of self-defense, and in particular explores how this concept is expressed within 
Japan’s unique and complex legal regime. While the two allies share strategic in-
terests and an integrated vision of regional security, understanding their separate 
legal systems can facilitate combined operations and help the two allies work 
together more efficiently.5 Making this process more transparent helps to inform 
American and Japanese decision makers and operational planners, reassures 
neighboring states that the alliance is strong and the two states are synchronized, 
and thereby dissuades potential adversaries.
This article proceeds as follows. First, we examine the relationship between the 
United States and Japan and the bilateral defense treaty that binds them. Second, 
we identify the key differences between the national security laws of the two 
countries. While U.S. forces conduct operations at the command of the president 
through executive power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, each operation 
the JMSDF conducts requires a specific, underlying law, since military operations 
are considered administrative actions by the government. Third, we explore the 
legal basis for self-defense in the face of armed attack, as applied within the two 
systems. While the U.S. president as commander in chief has a relatively simple 
legal basis for initiating self-defense actions, Japan must set in motion precise 
procedural and legislative processes before it can exercise the right of individual 
or collective self-defense. Finally, this article identifies how the United States and 
Japan lawfully may contend with threats short of war, or what Japan first termed 
the gray zone. While the United States responds to such challenges within the 
paradigm of self-defense, including unit self-defense, Japanese military action 
must be authorized under Japanese municipal law, not as self-defense but as a 
“use of weapons,” a related concept that is separate from national self-defense.
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The two pillars of Japan’s national security policy are national self-help and col-
lective self-defense with its treaty ally, the United States. The two approaches 
these pillars represent are reflected in the original and the current bilateral se-
curity treaties; the premises and purposes of the two treaties diverge widely. The 
first U.S.-Japan security treaty was signed on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco 
on the same day that Japan signed the Treaty of San Francisco (or the Treaty of 
Peace with Japan), which officially ended the Allied postwar occupation and 
returned sovereignty to Japan. Under article 1 of the 1951 security treaty, the 
United States accepted the responsibility to deploy armed forces to Japan to “con-
tribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and 
to the security of Japan.” The treaty recognized that Japan was unable to exercise 
its inherent right of self-defense because of postwar disarmament. The United 
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States, therefore, was solely responsible for defending Japan from external threats, 
as well as large-scale riots or internal disturbances, which at the time potentially 
included action by former imperial military forces.6 
Treaty Obligations
The second bilateral treaty was signed on 19 January 1960 by Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi (grandfather of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) and U.S. Secretary 
of State Christian A. Herter. This agreement is still in force. The new treaty con-
firmed that Japan was entitled to the right of self-defense and that the United 
States and Japan shared a common interest in international peace and the security 
of the Far East.7 
This treaty is composed of ten articles that set forth three principal obliga-
tions: (1) self-help and mutual aid, (2) mutual defense, and (3) the provision of 
bases in Japan for U.S. forces. First, article 3 requires the parties to develop and 
maintain the capacity to resist armed attack, “individually and in cooperation 
with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, 
subject to their constitutional provisions.”8 This obligation originally arose from 
the Vandenberg Resolution, which the U.S. Congress passed in June 1948. Sena-
tor Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI) crafted the resolution as the United States was 
joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to clarify U.S. security 
policy. The resolution insisted on incorporation of the principle of self-help 
and mutual aid into the NATO agreement to prevent free riding by European 
allies, which would impose an excessive burden on the United States. Self-help 
and mutual aid means that “the participants must be prepared fully to carry out 
their obligations under the Charter [of the United Nations], resolutely to defend 
their liberties against attack from any source, and efficiently to develop their 
maximum defense potential by coordination of their military forces.” Therefore, 
NATO members have an obligation to develop and maintain their defense capa-
bilities, regardless of the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The resolution 
was designed to save the Europeans from the moral hazard posed by free and 
unlimited defense provided by the United States and to insulate the United States 
from “open ended or unlimited commitments.”9 This sense also made its way into 
the U.S.-Japan agreement, and is codified in article 3 as the legal basis for Japan’s 
defense budget. Japan spends just over 1 percent of its gross domestic product on 
national defense.10 
Second, the 1960 treaty commits each state to mutual defense. Article 5 rec-
ognizes that an armed attack against either party in “the territories under the 
administration of Japan” would endanger the security of both parties. Therefore, 
Japan has a legal obligation to prepare and act to counter threats to territories 
it governs. The geographic scope of this provision always has included outlying 
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Japanese territories, such as the Senkaku Islands, as “territories under the admin-
istration of Japan.” In 1996, for example, the United States stated explicitly that 
the bilateral security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and presumably to any 
other territory under the administration of Japan, such as Okinotorishima.11 Im-
portantly, however, the treaty does not obligate Japan to exercise mutual defense 
to protect areas outside its territory or those under its administration.
Third, Japan has a legal obligation to provide bases in Japan for the use of 
American forces, and it has done so. For example, the U.S. Seventh Fleet flag-
ship, USS Blue Ridge, is forward-deployed to Yokosuka, along with Task Force 
(TF) 70, an aircraft carrier strike group led by USS Ronald Reagan, and TF 76, 
an expeditionary strike group with warships forward-deployed to Sasebo and 
a headquarters element located at White Beach, Okinawa.12 Article 6 ensures 
that U.S. forces may use facilities and training areas in Japan for the purpose of 
contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the Far East.13 This provision provides the legal basis for Japan 
to grant U.S. forces the use of military facilities and training areas. Rules on the 
status of U.S. forces in Japan, such as criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed 
by U.S. servicemembers, fall under a separate agreement, the U.S.-Japan Status 
of Forces Agreement.14 
The 2015 “Guidelines”
While the 1960 treaty sets the general terms of the relationship and bilateral 
obligations, more-detailed policies are contained in the “Guidelines for Japan-
U.S. Defense Cooperation.” This document has been formulated three times: in 
1978, 1997, and 2015. The latest iteration emphasizes five areas of cooperation: 
(1) seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; (2) synergy across 
the two governments’ national security policies; (3) a whole-of-government alli-
ance that leverages interagency coordination; (4) cooperation with regional and 
other partners, as well as international organizations; and (5) recognition of the 
global nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which produces security benefits that 
reverberate worldwide. These guidelines were written to be consistent with each 
nation’s constitution and national laws, as well as international law.15 
The guidelines are not legally binding, but they contain policy on alliance co-
ordination mechanisms, bilateral planning for contingencies, ballistic-missile de-
fense, cooperation abroad, and cooperation on outer space and cyberspace. The 
document is critical for shaping Japan’s laws concerning defense cooperation, be-
cause it includes some specific goals that are impossible to achieve without pro-
gressive legislation. For example, the 2015 iteration states that “the [Japan] Self-
Defense Forces [JSDF] and the U.S. Armed Forces will provide mutual protection 
of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the 
defense of Japan . . . including during training and exercises.”16 In response to this 
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mandate, Japan reformulated the legal basis for the JSDF to protect U.S. weapons 
and assets in peacetime, a function that earlier laws did not cover.17 
PARALLEL APPROACHES TO NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
There are fundamental differences between the American and Japanese ap-
proaches to national defense. While the operations of the U.S. armed forces 
emanate from the executive power in the form of an execute order (EXORD) 
issued by the Secretary of Defense, the operations of the JSDF flow from the 
government’s administrative actions. For this reason, U.S. military operations 
are implemented flexibly, whereas JSDF operations require specific statutory 
authorization.
The President’s War Powers
In the United States, the president exercises the “vast share of responsibility” for 
the conduct of foreign relations and national security.18 Article II, Section 1, of 
the U.S. Constitution states as follows: “The executive Power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States of America.” The president also is designated 
by Section 2 as commander in chief of the Army and the Navy. These powers 
allow the president “to direct the movements of the naval and military forces 
placed by law at his command.”19 This remit includes the authority to direct U.S. 
military forces in engagements necessary to advance American national inter-
ests abroad.20  Even in the absence of specific prior congressional approval, the 
president’s power to employ military force abroad derives from his constitutional 
responsibility as commander in chief.
This authority is confirmed by long-standing practice.21 In defending the 
authority of President George Washington, for example, to issue the 1793 Neu-
trality Proclamation during the French Revolution, Alexander Hamilton wrote 
that the president’s “executive power” in Article II of the Constitution and his 
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” included the power uni-
laterally to proclaim neutrality in armed conflict.22 This custom was followed by 
his contemporaries—Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe—and 
more-recent American leaders have expanded presidential powers even further.
It was when President John Adams was criticized for extraditing Thomas Nash, 
alias Jonathan Robbins, to Great Britain (to stand trial for a murder committed 
on a British ship) that John Marshall as a member of the House of Representatives 
in 1800 argued that the president had the authority to do so because he was the 
“sole organ” of the nation in foreign affairs.23 In 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court 
repeated this characterization of presidential power in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.24 In that case, the court ruled that the president has plenary 
powers in foreign affairs, which has led to the axiom “Curtiss Wright and the 
president is always right!” The president’s virtually unlimited authority in foreign 
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affairs became an article of faith, with Senator J. William Fulbright stating in 1961 
that it was “clear and unalterable” that the president enjoyed “pre-eminent re-
sponsibility” in managing U.S. foreign relations.25 Contemporary presidents have 
continued to hew to this position. In October 2016, for example, President Barack 
Obama used his constitutional authority to direct U.S. military strikes against 
radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.26 Likewise, in April 2018 
President Donald Trump ordered U.S. forces to attack chemical weapons sites 
in Syria, without congressional approval.27 Trump followed up with a strike in 
Baghdad on 3 January 2020 that killed Qassem Soleimani, commander of the 
Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.28 
Efforts by Congress to limit presidential powers have been controversial. The 
War Powers Act, passed—over President Richard Nixon’s veto—on 7 November 
1973, states that the president, as commander in chief, possesses constitutional 
powers to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities or into situations where 
hostilities are imminent, but only pursuant to one of three conditions: (1) a decla-
ration of war by the U.S. Congress; (2) specific statutory authorization by the U.S. 
Congress; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, 
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.29 The act requires the president 
to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities, 
and to report such military intervention within forty-eight hours to the Speaker 
of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. The president also 
is required to terminate any employment of the armed forces within sixty days 
after the report unless the operations are validated through congressional au-
thorization.30 All U.S. presidents, however, have rejected as unconstitutional this 
and other attempted congressional limitations on their freedom of action, and 
the War Powers Act remains contentious. In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
appeared to defer to the executive power of the president, placing “significant 
weight” on a division of authority weighted toward the president.31 Throughout 
the debates over presidential power, Congress has acquiesced, and the president 
continues to act unilaterally.32 
The Diet’s Use-of-Force Powers
The Japanese system is more complicated. While the legal basis for U.S. military 
operations derives from the executive power of the president, the JSDF may act 
only pursuant to authorization by the national Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature. 
It is unlawful for the prime minister to order a deployment of the JSDF without 
a specific authorizing law.33 This arrangement reflects the war-renunciation 
clause of the constitution (article 9), which reads as follows: “Aspiring sincerely 
to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes. 
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“In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of bel-
ligerency of the state will not be recognized.”34 
The Japanese government interprets article 9 as banning the maintenance of 
armed forces whose purpose is to threaten or use force as a means of settling in-
ternational disputes, but preserving the nation’s inherent right of self-defense. It 
is constitutional for Japan to maintain the JSDF, to the minimum extent required 
to ensure self-defense.35 Because the constitution does not permit maintaining 
armed forces and a war potential, it does not specify or provide for command and 
control (C2) of operations of the armed forces. There is no executive power or 
authority analogous to that of the commander in chief, so C2 functions are based 
on article 72 of the constitution, which states that the prime minister represents 
the cabinet and submits bills to the Diet for the “exercise of control and supervi-
sion over various administrative branches.”36 Consequently, C2 of the JSDF is 
conducted through administrative orders to a general administrative branch, on 
the basis of existing laws.37 In sum, this unique constitutional framework means 
that Japan must contend with any armed attack, or the threat of an armed at-
tack, through the nation’s emergency-management apparatus and administrative 
control process. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Japanese constitution does not 
confer executive power on a single political leader.
NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN RESPONSE TO ARMED ATTACK
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat or use 
of force in international relations. The inherent right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense is reflected in article 51, and may be invoked “if armed attack 
occurs.”38 The meaning of armed attack as a matter of international law is debat-
able.39 In the 1980s-era case between Nicaragua and the United States (referred to 
as the Paramilitary Activities Case), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dis-
tinguished the most grave forms of the use of force from other, less grave forms. 
Only the former constitute an armed attack and therefore are subject to action 
in self-defense.40 Consequently, the ICJ and most scholars suggest there lies a 
gap between an unlawful use of force in article 2(4) and the right of self-defense 
against an armed attack in article 51.41 On the basis of the Paramilitary Activities 
decision, Japan believes that the gap theory accurately describes the test for the 
lawful exercise of self-defense in international law. The United States, in contrast, 
has rejected the idea of a gap, and reserves the right to use force in self-defense 
even against less grave forms of aggression.42 In the American view, the United 
States may respond with force against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile 
intent if it believes it constitutes an armed attack.43 
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In addition to the difference of interpretation of an armed attack, there is a 
difference between Japan and the United States in the process that triggers the 
right of self-defense. While the U.S. president can deploy and tactically maneuver 
U.S. armed forces through an EXORD issued by the Secretary of Defense at any 
time before, during, or after a crisis or armed attack, Japan must obtain a cabinet 
decision and Diet approval to conduct such operations.
The U.S. AUMF and Executive Orders
The United States recognizes three circumstances in which states may employ 
military force in international politics. First, states may use force pursuant to the 
authority of the UN Security Council, acting under the authority of chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. Second, force may be used in self-defense, in accordance with 
article 51; but again, the United States takes a rather elastic view that most states 
do not share. And third, force may be used with the consent of the territorial state 
in which force is exercised, such as when a state requests assistance in suppressing 
a rebellion.44 Regardless of which basis is invoked, for the United States the use 
of force overseas must satisfy at least one of two legal conditions: congressional 
approval of the use of force, typically through an authorization for use of military 
force (AUMF); or presidential action under his own authority.
An example of the first case occurred when, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, 
Congress passed an AUMF that authorized the president to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force” against nations and terrorist organizations that had conducted 
the attacks and those who aided them in doing so or harbored them.45 Presidents 
Obama and Trump relied on this AUMF as the legal basis for conducting military 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and in East 
Africa and Libya.46 In the second case, the president may use force unilaterally, re-
gardless of authorization from Congress, pursuant to his power as commander in 
chief. Examples include the bombing in Libya (1986); the intervention in Panama 
(1989); troop deployments to Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 
1994 and 2004); air patrols and air strikes in Bosnia (1993–95); and a bombing 
campaign in Yugoslavia (1999).47 In short, the United States relies on presidential 
action, albeit sometimes in parallel with specific congressional authorization. 
Congress has attempted to limit this second type of military operations under the 
aforementioned War Powers Act.
Japan’s Three Principles and Three Situations
Because of its constitution, Japan operates within a restrictive national defense 
policy. Generally, force may be employed only in the event of an armed attack—as 
the Nicaragua decision has shaped that term—and then using only the minimum 
force necessary. The United States, in contrast, holds that it may use force to repel 
all illegal threats to the nation or U.S. forces.48 Importantly, Japan defines armed 
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attack strictly as the “organized and premeditated use of force against Japan.”49 
The criteria “organized” and “premeditated” are not perfunctory and must be 
satisfied; sporadic and occasional combat or accidental or unauthorized action 
by foreign armed forces may not always constitute armed attack, in the Japanese 
view. Japan must assess whether an attacker had a clear intention to attack before 
it makes a determination that the aggressor actually conducted an armed attack. 
Consequently, Japan maintains only limited military capabilities necessary for 
minimum self-defense.
Three principles clarify the meaning of minimum self-defense in Japan. First, 
a minimum level of force may be used in self-defense to resist an armed attack 
against Japan once it occurs, or when an armed attack against a foreign country 
that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and as a result threatens Japan’s 
survival and poses a clear danger that might fundamentally overturn the Japanese 
people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The principle that Japan 
can use force in self-defense in the face of an armed attack against a “country in 
a close relationship with Japan” clearly references the United States. Second, a 
minimum level of force may be employed in self-defense when there is no other 
appropriate means available to repel an attack and such force is necessary to en-
sure the survival of the nation of Japan and protect its people. Third, when force 
is used it must be the minimum necessary to defend Japan or another country in 
a close relationship with Japan.50 
The JSDF will use force for self-defense when an armed attack against Japan 
occurs, but Japan may exercise the right of self-defense only in special or desig-
nated situations, and with the approval of the Diet. The three types of situations, 
or specific scenarios, are (1) an anticipated armed-attack situation; (2) an armed-
attack situation; and (3) a survival-threatening situation. There is no lawful basis 
for the JSDF to mobilize and use force unless the Diet declares one of these situ-
ations to exist.
Anticipated Armed-Attack Situation. Japan lawfully may deploy JSDF units when 
an armed attack has yet to occur but threatening circumstances are alarming and 
a future armed attack is anticipated.51 Although in this circumstance an attack 
is said to be anticipated, that term differs from the idea in the international law 
of jus ad bellum that states may use force in “anticipatory self-defense” to strike 
against a gathering threat.52 The theory of anticipatory self-defense is based on 
the response of a state facing a threat, when the aggressor has taken concrete steps 
toward the initiation of an attack, thereby justifying the exercise of the right of 
self-defense on the part of the defending state. By contrast, in the case of antici-
pated armed-attack situations, armed aggression is expected, but the aggressor 
has not taken any tangible steps toward conducting an attack. The government of 
9
Kraska and Saito: The Law of Military Operations and Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
 9 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Japan determines the existence of an anticipated armed-attack situation through 
a cabinet decision, with approval by the Diet.53 
In such a case, the JSDF can redeploy self-defense forces to new locations and 
order them to execute duties as a legal obligation to ready the force to act im-
mediately should an armed attack occur.54 Under this legal authority, the JSDF 
also may construct facilities for operations in the planned area to prepare to 
counter an attack, and it may provide logistics support for U.S. armed forces that 
would be responding to the armed attack, in accordance with the current U.S.-
Japan security treaty. Examples of support the JSDF may provide to U.S. forces 
include supplies; transportation; communications; military repair, depot, and 
maintenance facilities; medical services; construction and operation of seaports 
and airports; and access to military bases for accommodations, storage, facili-
ties, and training.55 The JSDF even may supply ammunition to U.S. forces, but it 
cannot deliver missiles, mines, torpedoes, nuclear warheads, chaff, or chemical 
weapons.56 Under this scenario, the JSDF also may recall reserve personnel to 
active duty.57
Armed-Attack Situation. In this second situation a foreign power has conducted 
an armed attack against Japan or there is an imminent danger of such an attack. 
Assessment of this situation is performed ad hoc. The government then promul-
gates what is called a “basic response plan,” which requires a cabinet decision and 
Diet approval.58 After such approval, the prime minister may order the JSDF to 
conduct a defense operation, which may include the use of force.59 Under article 
88 of the JSDF law, in this situation the JSDF may employ “necessary force to 
defend [the] country.” Although Diet determination of the basic response plan—
which includes recognition of the existence of an armed-attack situation and the 
intended response to it—normally is a precondition for the use of force, in an 
emergency the prime minister can ask for Diet approval after the operation al-
ready has been ordered.60 
Under the order of a defense operation, the JSDF acquires additional authori-
ties besides the use of force. For example, the minister of defense can exercise C2 
of Japan Coast Guard (JCG) forces as part of the national response. The JSDF can 
requisition hospitals, vehicle maintenance facilities, shipyards, and port facilities, 
and even may seize private property and homes.61 Further, to prevent a neutral 
state’s vessels from transporting foreign military supplies (limited war contra-
band, such as weapons or ammunition) toward enemy states in an area where an 
armed attack against Japan is occurring, the JSDF can conduct naval operations 
to control and interdict international shipping, including directing foreign-
flagged vessels into port for inspection.62 Such an operation is distinct from the 
peacetime right of approach and visit.63 It also is somewhat different from the 
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belligerent right of visit and search during time of war, since an inspection team 
conducting a boarding during a defense operation is not authorized to destroy a 
ship carrying contraband goods.64 
Survival-Threatening Situation for Collective Self-defense. This third scenario 
involves collective self-defense, of a sort.65 From the institution of the first bilat-
eral security treaty until 2015, Japan held the position that the bar for exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense is higher than the threshold for the minimum 
exercise of self-defense. The latter is permitted by the constitution, whereas Japan 
possesses the right of collective self-defense as a matter of international law.66 On 
19 September 2015, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party passed new legislation that reinterpreted the Japanese constitu-
tion to permit certain carefully prescribed operations for collective self-defense. 
The new law entered into force on 29 March 2016.
A survival-threatening situation for collective self-defense exists after an 
armed attack occurs against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with 
Japan, and as a result Japan’s survival is threatened. While the Japanese govern-
ment has not clarified the specific application of this provision, generally this 
concept envisions an attack against the United States or U.S. forces.67 Such an 
attack would be regarded as posing a clear danger to Japan, with the potential 
fundamentally to overturn the rights of the Japanese people to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness. This new approach was explained in a cabinet decision 
as follows:
[A]s a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the 
Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against 
Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a 
close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and 
poses a clear danger to overturn in a fundamental way people’s right to life, liberty, 
and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to 
repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the 
minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Consti-
tution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Govern-
ment’s view to date.68 
The cabinet must certify that these conditions exist and gain Diet approval 
to formulate a basic response plan.69 Unlike emergency circumstances that give 
rise to the armed-attack situation, the cabinet decision and Diet approval for the 
survival-threatening situation of collective self-defense may not be made after the 
assessment; however, the prime minister may order a defense operation, under 
which the JSDF can exercise the use of force.70 This approach reflects the right of 
collective self-defense in international law.71 In Japan’s case, however, the JSDF’s 
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exercise of collective self-defense is limited to situations in which Japan’s survival 
is threatened, and the sole purpose is to protect Japan.72
More broadly, even though collective self-defense is recognized as a principle 
of international law, Japan cannot exercise its full scale or scope because of its 
constitutional limitations. For example, although the Gulf War was conducted 
under the auspices of the UN Security Council as a lawful operation in collective 
self-defense, Japan could not participate in large-scale air strikes or take actions 
against enemy forces, because such engagement in hostilities would have been 
deemed unconstitutional, since the operations did not bear directly on the sur-
vival of Japan.73
TACTICAL SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR
Japanese law does not provide authority to act in tactical situations short of war. 
Yoram Dinstein refers to operations short of war as tactical, small-scale, armed 
attacks in situ, and the employment of counterforce in defense.74 For the United 
States, such situations may exist even when there is neither a specific AUMF nor 
an executive order authorizing actions in response to small-scale armed attack; 
the president acts pursuant to his powers as commander in chief. Under such 
circumstances, while U.S. forces confronting these limited attacks may exercise 
individual or unit self-defense, the JSDF responds in accordance with laws that 
permit the use of weapons, since none of the three situations discussed previ-
ously provides authority to act in such scenarios. The statutes that authorize use 
of weapons are law-enforcement statutes; they include the Law for Protection of 
SDF’s Weapons and Other Equipment, the Law for Protection of the Weapons 
and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of 
Other Countries, and the Law for Guarding Facilities.75 
First we will describe the U.S. approach, then contrast it with that of Japan. The 
U.S. system is simpler and more flexible than Japan’s.
U.S. Rules of Engagement for Unit Self-defense
The U.S. decision-making system employs a flexible approach to responding to 
low-level attacks. American commanders have a right—indeed, an obligation—
to protect their units from any threats by exercising unit self-defense. The U.S. 
Standing Rules of Engagement, for example, states as follows:
Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit 
self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless a unit 
commander directs otherwise, as detailed below, military members may exercise 
individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. 
When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense 
should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may 
limit individual self-defense by members of their unit. Both unit and individual self-
defense include defense of other U.S. military forces in the vicinity.76
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The exercise of unit self-defense is deemed an expression of the inherent 
right of national self-defense, as recognized by article 51 of the UN Charter and 
customary international law. Consequently, unit self-defense is derived from cus-
tomary international law, and it may be extended to protect units and individuals 
from other nations, which then would be authorized by the applicable rules of 
engagement (ROEs).77 
Law Enforcement and the Use of Weapons by Japan
In contrast to U.S. practice, the Japanese response applies a law-enforcement 
approach in all situations short of war. The same cautionary rules for the use 
of force apply as when responding to the actions of common felons, and other 
criminal matters. Even though it is the JSDF conducting operations, the legal 
basis for doing so lies in law enforcement, not national self-defense. This is so 
mainly owing to Japan’s strict definition of armed attack and the country’s strict 
procedures for authorizing the use of force. Japan refers to these law-enforcement 
acts as the use of weapons, to distinguish them from the use of force under the 
exercise of the right of self-defense. Since the use of weapons in these situations 
is deemed to be merely acts of law enforcement, Diet approval is not required. 
The JSDF has authority to use weapons under this law-enforcement paradigm in 
three specific situations, as detailed below.
Protecting JSDF Weapons and Equipment. While the JSDF cannot use force ex-
cept when the prime minister issues a defense operation order on the basis of 
the existence of certain situations, under certain other conditions it actually may 
employ weapons to protect JSDF property, including weapons and munitions, 
ships and aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and fuel. Members of 
the JSDF who are specifically on duty to protect these assets may use weapons to 
the extent reasonably necessary, in accordance with the requirement of propor-
tionality, under the right of individual self-defense. The situation requires that it 
be impossible to protect the weapons by other means, such as withdrawal.78 In 
Japan’s system, such a use of weapons is different from the exercise of self-defense 
under international law or unit self-defense in the U.S. conception.
The penal code authorizes the exercise of “individual self-defense” and “aver-
sion of a present danger” in cases involving the use of weapons to protect weap-
ons in urgent situations.79 The JSDF’s right to use weapons ceases if the objects 
whose protection is intended are destroyed completely or the attackers abort the 
attack and break off contact. That is, the right to use weapons is a rather nar-
rowly construed law-enforcement measure; for instance, it does not even permit 
pursuit of the attackers. In national self-defense and unit self-defense, defensive 
action may continue until the threat has disappeared completely, even after 
the attack is interrupted and the aggressors begin to flee. In the case of a use of 
weapons, however, defensive rights must be proportional to the threat, narrowly 
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circumscribed to the immediate zone of attack, and include only limited rights 
of protection.
Japan’s Use of Weapons to Protect U.S. and Other Foreign Assets. To protect for-
eign weapons, equipment, or other assets, the JSDF required additional legal au-
thority. Section 2 of article 95 of the JSDF law authorizes the use of weapons to 
protect U.S. and other foreign armed forces’ weapons and other assets if they 
actually are engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in coop-
eration with the JSDF, including peacetime activities such as joint exercises and 
training. The use of weapons is authorized only in situations in which reasonable 
grounds for action exist, and only to the extent reasonably necessary. Important-
ly, this protection is provided during routine peacetime operations and does not 
require the Diet to issue a specific national defense authorization on the basis of 
one of the aforementioned situations.
To distinguish the use of weapons from the use of force by other countries, 
the JSDF will not conduct this protection in an area of hostilities. Therefore, Ja-
pan does not regard this protection as either a use of force or an act of collective 
self-defense against an armed attack. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to 
persons, except in a case of individual self-defense or “averting present danger.”80 
Furthermore, this option may be exercised only after the JSDF receives a request 
from U.S. or other foreign armed forces.
Use of Weapons to Guard Facilities. Military facilities may be protected by yet 
a third type of authority for the use of weapons.81 While every ministry has the 
administrative right to operate facilities and guard its installations, this author-
ity by itself does not permit the use of lethal weapons to protect them. The JSDF, 
however, has additional legal authorization, under the statute on guarding facili-
ties, to use weapons to protect its installations.82 
This law applies only to JSDF facilities in Japan and persons in those facilities, 
including personnel who are not members of the JSDF, and does not apply to 
JSDF members outside these facilities. The JSDF personnel assigned to guard or 
patrol duties on these installations may use weapons when reasonable grounds 
exist to protect themselves or others, and to the extent reasonably necessary. This 
law provides law-enforcement authority, and the use of weapons shall not cause 
harm to persons except for the two exceptions specified in the penal code (self-
defense and averting present danger). Likewise, the JSDF must cease its use of 
weapons if the attackers halt the attack and withdraw.83 
FILLING GAPS IN JAPANESE LAW
While U.S. forces operate flexibly—by executive order, and without consider-
ing gaps between the gravest forms of the use of force and other, less grave 
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forms—Japan requires specific laws that direct the JSDF to conduct operations 
in response to threats that constitute the gravest forms of the use of force (i.e., 
armed attack). Japan then is permitted to respond under the right of national 
self-defense. 
Owing to the stricter definition of armed attack in Japan, however, the country 
must consider whether an attack is organized and reflects the belligerent inten-
tion of an aggressor state or quasi state (e.g., Hezbollah) to qualify as an armed 
attack. This threshold is high, and the JSDF may act only under specific laws 
discussed in the preceding “Tactical Situations Short of War” section on the use 
of weapons to respond to threats that lie below the threshold of armed attack. 
This section explores the JSDF laws enacted to fill these gaps in the use-of-force 
architecture, including maritime-security operations (MSOs) and destruction 
measures against inbound ballistic missiles.
Maritime Security Operations in Response to Gray-Zone Challenges
In peacetime, the JCG is responsible for confronting ships that violate Japanese 
law in the territorial waters of Japan; the JMSDF does not have such authority. 
However, if the challenge overwhelms the capabilities of the JCG, the JMSDF may 
respond under provisions providing for the ordering of an MSO.84 
The JMSDF has authority to conduct MSOs, with this authority deriving from 
the Coast Guard Law, so the exercise of this authority is deemed to be neces-
sary for law enforcement.85 Applicable sections of the statute include article 16 
(request of cooperation for citizen and ship), article 17 (query, order to submit 
documents, order to stop ship, and ship visit), and article 18 (measures of dis-
placement, expulsion, takedown, and stopping a vessel). There are three types 
of MSOs: operations against merchant shipping, operations against foreign war-
ships that have sovereign immunity from Japan’s jurisdiction, and operations 
against submerged submarines. For example, in November 2004, the JMSDF 
observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating in Japa-
nese territorial waters near the Sakishima Islands. In response, an MSO order 
was issued and JMSDF warships and aircraft tracked the submarine until it left 
the territorial sea.86 
During MSOs of the first type, the JMSDF may take measures against civilian 
merchant ships to determine whether they are violating Japan’s domestic law, in 
three circumstances. First, the JMSDF may confirm a violation, at which point it 
hands the merchant ship off to the JCG, which has judicial authority to investi-
gate and charge suspected criminals. Second, even if a ship has not violated the 
law, the JMSDF may expel it from Japan’s territorial waters if the vessel is believed 
to pose a threat to or contribute to a deterioration of public order in the territo-
rial sea.87 Third, the JMSDF may use weapons against civilian ships if necessary 
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for unit self-defense and to overcome resistance, but the use of these weapons to 
harm people is limited to “averting present danger.”88 
In the three circumstances discussed above, the use of weapons is limited to 
that extent reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Weapons may be used, 
for example, if a foreign ship ignores an order to stop or attempts to resist the 
JMSDF. In such a scenario, the minister of defense must certify that the following 
four conditions are met: (1) An alleged civilian ship is a foreign-flagged vessel, is 
conducting noninnocent passage in Japan’s territorial sea, and has no justification 
for its actions. (2) If the ship is left unchallenged, it is highly likely the harmful 
conduct will be repeated in the future. (3) There is a suspicion that the presence 
of the ship is in preparation for conducting some “serious and heinous” (felony) 
crime. (4) It is impossible to prevent these criminal acts simply by obtaining in-
formation from, stopping, and visiting the suspect ship. In addition to the defense 
minister’s certification, there is an additional condition: (5) The commanding 
officer of the JMSDF warship must believe there is no alternative to firing at the 
ship to stop it.89 
In the second type of MSO, the procedures may be used against a foreign war-
ship that is in the territorial sea but not conducting innocent passage. This ap-
plication of authority is different from that used against a civilian ship, because a 
warship has sovereign immunity from foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, the JMSDF 
may not use force to compel compliance on the part of the foreign warship but 
instead must request that it comply, requiring it to leave the territorial sea. In 
such a case, Japan operates in accordance with article 30 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires foreign warships 
not in innocent passage to “leave the territorial sea immediately.”90 
In the third type of MSO, submerged submarines operating in Japan’s ter-
ritorial sea are in violation of innocent passage and pose yet another scenario 
that requires countermeasures. Under UNCLOS, a foreign submarine in the 
territorial sea is required to transit on the surface and show its flag.91 The JCG is 
not equipped to respond to the threat of submerged submarines, so the JMSDF 
may conduct MSOs in such circumstances. Although MSOs normally require 
a cabinet decision and the approval of the prime minister, these formalities are 
dispensed with in the case of a submerged submarine; the prime minister may 
approve this type of MSO without awaiting a decision of the cabinet.92 The 
JMSDF may track and report underwater contacts until the prime minister 
issues an MSO, which authorizes the JMSDF to request any submerged subma-
rine to surface. Even if the submarine continues to navigate submerged in the 
territorial sea, force (the use of weapons) may not be employed to repel it until 
an MSO is issued.93 
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Ballistic-Missile Defense
Japan and the United States also differ in how they approach authority to conduct 
ballistic-missile-defense operations. The U.S. president has authority to respond 
to and destroy inbound ballistic missiles that threaten the United States.94 In 
Japan, the JSDF can use force in such a scenario only after the Diet makes the de-
termination of an armed-attack situation or survival-threatening situation and the 
prime minister initiates an order for the JSDF to commence defense operations. 
If a ballistic missile is launched against Japan under this situation, the JSDF has 
authority to intercept it in flight; however, the elapsed time between the launch of 
a missile by North Korea and its impact on Japan might be just four minutes, so 
requiring the procedures discussed above would not be practical.95 North Korea 
often has launched ballistic missiles under the guise of placing a satellite into 
orbit. Given the ambiguity involved in each such launch, Japan’s government has 
no time to approve the determination of an armed-attack situation or survival-
threatening situation, or to deem that the launch constitutes the gravest form of 
the use of force, or to interpret the action as an armed attack, any of which could 
trigger the national right of self-defense.
To address this dilemma, the Japanese government enacted the Law Concern-
ing Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles to provide separate legal 
subauthority to counter the threat of ballistic missiles.96 This law applies when 
the intention of the nation launching a rocket into outer space is unknown, the 
timing of the launch is unknown, and the object to be launched into space is not 
known but may be harmful if it strikes Japan. Under the category of “destruc-
tion measures against ballistic missiles,” the JSDF may use advanced weapons 
for ballistic-missile defense, including the Standard Missile–3s installed on 
JMSDF Aegis destroyers and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability–3s. 
These measures constitute another form of the use of weapons and not the use of 
force. Ironically, this means that Japan uses what is essentially a law-enforcement 
authority to respond to time-critical threats from ballistic missiles, rockets for 
artificial satellites, and other objects in flight (except aircraft) flying toward Ja-
pan that may cause serious damage to citizens and properties.97 Importantly, this 
law targets only missiles incoming to Japanese territory; it does not cover the 
interception of ballistic missiles bound for the United States or other countries. 
While this authority might be used to counter inbound hypersonic glide vehicles, 
antiballistic-missile technology may be ineffective against them.
Public-Security Operations
In the United States, the National Guard of each state may respond to a collapse 
of public order or security that police forces cannot handle. In contrast, the Posse 
Comitatus Act restricts the U.S. Army from engaging in law enforcement within 
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the United States.98 But since Japan does not possess a National Guard or an 
equivalent militia force, the JSDF would respond in such situations.
In Japan, there are two legal bases for the JSDF to conduct operations to secure 
the public safety. The prime minister, with the consent of the Diet, may order a 
public-security operation when it is deemed that the public security cannot be 
maintained by law enforcement alone, including because of indirect aggression, 
such as an insurgency.99 The prime minister also may order a public-security op-
eration if a prefectural governor requests such, to maintain the peace in serious 
situations.100 In both cases, the JSDF is authorized to exercise police functions and 
use weapons to prevent, control, and quell riots and to guard high-priority offi-
cials, without the necessity to consider questions of self-defense under article 36 
or averting present danger under article 37 of the Penal Code, which are beyond 
the purview of the policy.101
JAPAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
While historically the maintenance of international peace, more generally con-
sidered, was beyond the purview of the U.S.-Japan alliance, in recent years Japan 
has taken steps to contribute more fully to global society. Section V.B. of the 2015 
“Guidelines” sets forth the global importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the 
need for greater cooperation with regional and other partners.102 After the 2015 
version of “Guidelines” was adopted, Japan enacted several laws to authorize the 
JSDF to conduct operations related, and contributing more broadly, to the main-
tenance of international peace and security.
For these purposes, three statutory bases exist. First, Japan may conduct op-
erations to support U.S. forces and those of other foreign countries. Second, the 
JSDF may initiate maritime operations to enforce UN Security Council sanctions 
effectively. Third, the JSDF may engage in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). 
When operating under one of these three authorities, the JSDF may be required 
to comply with special limitations imposed on its operations. To facilitate in-
teroperability, it is imperative for U.S. forces and other partner nations operating 
with the JSDF to understand the scope of those limitations.
Situations That Influence Japan’s Peace and Security
In limited situations, Japan may support U.S. forces engaged in operations 
aimed at containing or unwinding local or regional conflicts. Japan’s constitu-
tion allows the JSDF to operate to promote peace in Japan, so the supported 
operations must have some nexus to Japan’s security. In these operations, the 
JSDF is permitted to act in situations or scenarios deemed to have an “impor-
tant influence on Japan’s peace and security” but that fall below the threshold of 
an armed-attack situation in national self-defense or a survival-threatening situ-
ation under collective self-defense. The law defines “situations that influence 
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Japan’s peace and security” as those that, if left unattended, could result in a 
direct armed attack on Japan, with important consequences for Japan’s peace 
and security. In such situations, the JSDF can support U.S. and other foreign 
armed forces engaged in operations that contribute to the objectives of the 
bilateral security treaty and promote the goals of the UN Charter. Importantly, 
there is no geographic limitation to this authority, so Japan could decide that 
a situation that occurred outside the region could influence Japan’s peace and 
security, such as a NATO contingency in Europe. The Diet must approve a find-
ing in advance that this type of situation exists, although ex post facto approval 
is allowed in an emergency.103 
The law to authorize operations in response to “situations that influence Ja-
pan’s peace and security” covers provision of military logistics, search-and-rescue 
(SAR) capabilities, ship-inspection operations, and other necessary measures. 
Japan differentiates ship-inspection operations from maritime-interception op-
erations, as discussed in the next section. The JSDF also may provide supplies; 
repair and maintenance services; communications; medical services; airport, 
seaport, and other transportation services; base activities (lodging, storage, and 
military use of facilities); and training services. While the provision of weapons 
is not included within the scope of this authority, the supplying of combat-related 
ammunition and the refueling and maintenance of aircraft are included. These 
measures may be undertaken in other countries, with the consent of the foreign 
states involved.104 
Ship-Inspection Operations
In an armed-conflict situation, the JMSDF may conduct the belligerent right of 
visit and search to determine the character of ships and cargo, locate contraband, 
and identify potential military targets. Such operations are conducted pursuant 
to Japan’s right to use force in national self-defense. In such cases, Japan also may 
regulate neutral shipping.105
The belligerent right of visit and search during armed conflict at sea is dis-
tinguished from peacetime ship-inspection operations (SIOs), which may be 
conducted to secure effective compliance with economic sanctions. The JMSDF 
may conduct an SIO under the domestic legal authority of an important influence 
situation, pursuant to the International Peace Support Act and to enforcing UN 
Security Council resolutions, or through obtaining the consent of the flag state.106
Compared with SIOs, maritime-interception operations (MIOs) encompass a 
broader range of activities at sea, including querying the master of a vessel; order-
ing it to stop; boarding, inspecting, and searching it; and even seizing the vessel 
and cargo. In addition to exercising its belligerent rights under the law of naval 
warfare, Japan may conduct MIOs pursuant to flag-state and master’s consent, as 
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enforcement measures against stateless vessels, when exercising the right of self-
defense, and as a condition of port entry.107 MIOs also may be used to enforce 
Security Council mandates, including diversion into port for inspection, while 
SIOs are limited to requesting a change of destination.108 While in an MIO the 
firing of warning shots is permitted as a communications signal to a noncompli-
ant vessel, in an SIO warning shots are not permitted. Because MIOs and SIOs 
are so different, the separate geographic areas in which they apply are specified.
Peacekeeping Operations
Japan has considered deploying JSDF units in support of PKOs to signify that 
the country has shouldered the role of responsible stakeholder in the community 
of nations.109 The JSDF may conduct international peace-cooperation activities 
not directly related to Japan’s security under two laws: the International Peace 
Cooperation Act (IPCA) and the International Peace Support Act (IPSA). Both 
require Diet approval, in two-year increments.
The IPCA provides the legal basis for the JSDF to contribute to UN PKOs, 
international humanitarian-relief operations, and international election ob-
servations.110 When such JSDF deployments are made, they are subject to five 
conditions: (1) The JSDF will not participate unless an agreement on a cease-fire 
has been reached among the parties to an armed conflict. (2–3) Consent for the 
conduct of UN PKOs, as well as Japan’s participation in such operations, shall 
have been obtained from the host country and the parties to the conflict. (4) The 
operations shall maintain strict impartiality and not favor any of the parties in the 
conflict. (5) The International Peace Cooperation Corps of Japan may suspend 
operations if these rules are not followed.111 
IPCA operations must be based on resolutions of the UN General Assem-
bly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council; or requested by 
UN organs established by the General Assembly or specialized agencies, funds, 
and programs, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; 
or otherwise specified by an order from the cabinet, regional organizations as 
prescribed in article 52 of the UN Charter, or organs established by multilateral 
treaties. The missions must be undertaken at the request of the countries in the 
area in which they are conducted.112 
JSDF personnel who are engaged in duties under the IPCA may use their 
weapons to the extent considered necessary and proper in light of the situation. 
This standard is determined according to the following formula:
1. When there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means 
other than the use of weapons will protect against physical harm or death 
of (a) themselves (the JSDF personnel in question); (b) other JSDF person-
nel operating with them; or (c) personnel of Japan’s International Peace 
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Cooperation Corps working in the line of duty or who have come under 
the protection of JSDF personnel
2. When there are attacks against JSDF personnel jointly stationed with 
foreign personnel, such as foreign armed forces’ units, and there are 
reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign 
personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other 
personnel stationed together
3. With regard to JSDF personnel engaged in so-called safety-ensuring 
operations and JSDF personnel engaged in kaketsuke-keigo operations 
(the protection of individuals in response to an urgent request), when 
there are reasonable grounds for determining that there exist no 
appropriate means of overcoming such situations except for the use of 
weapons to protect their own lives, bodies, or assets or those of other 
individuals, or to eliminate actions that obstruct their duties113
The use of weapons under the IPCA shall not cause harm to persons except 
for cases falling under article 36 (individual self-defense) or article 37 (averting 
present danger) of the Penal Code of Japan.
The IPSA provides a second legal basis for the JSDF to participate in 
international-cooperation activities.114 While the IPCA covers PKOs, the IPSA cov-
ers logistics support, SAR activities, and SIOs. These operations may be conducted 
in accordance with resolutions of the UN General Assembly or Security Council. 
Since such operations, as conducted by the JSDF, do not constitute an exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense, deployed units must avoid integration with 
the operations of the armed forces of foreign states during this type of mission.115 
Therefore, the JSDF does not conduct such support activities in combat zones.
Use of weapons under the IPSA is more limited than under the rules set forth 
in the IPCA. While the rules for the use of weapons are similar under the two 
statutes, under the IPSA safety-ensuring operations and kaketsuke-keigo are not 
authorized. In the event of an attack within a military installation or camp, JSDF 
personnel may use weapons when there are no alternative locations within the 
vicinity to ensure the safety of JSDF units and other personnel. As with the IPCA, 
the use of weapons pursuant to the IPSA shall not cause harm to persons except 
for cases falling under article 36 (individual self-defense) or article 37 (averting 
present danger) of the Penal Code of Japan.
The bilateral U.S.-Japan security partnership is the most important alliance 
in the most important part of the world. It upholds the values that undergird 
international peace and stability in East Asia. The two powerful democracies, 
however, operate within distinct national legal systems and their interpretations 
21
Kraska and Saito: The Law of Military Operations and Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
 1 0 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
of international law sometimes differ. The U.S. Constitution affords the president 
virtually unlimited authority to respond to foreign threats, deploy forces, and use 
force to defend U.S. interests, whereas the prime minister of Japan typically must 
seek a specific legal basis for every JSDF action. The Japanese approach requires 
time to coordinate the action with the Diet and gain the approval of key lawmak-
ers, which opens a vulnerability that an adversary might exploit during a time 
of crisis. While Japan may exercise the right of collective self-defense in limited 
situations—when faced with existential threats to its security—without first go-
ing through the Diet, the American approach is much less restrictive.
Compared with the United States, Japan defines armed attack and use of force 
more strictly. It allows the JSDF to use force, but in narrowly prescribed situa-
tions, and then only after adhering to strict intergovernmental processes. Japan 
also recognizes a gap between an armed attack and the right of self-defense in 
international law, while the United States does not. The United States, therefore, 
may resort to the use of force against a hostile act or even a demonstration of 
hostile intent. These differences in interpretations of international law and con-
stitutional structures have produced distinct legislation and authority for the 
JSDF and U.S. armed forces.
The current security environment is most likely to highlight these differences 
in three situations. First, the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance is changing from one 
focused purely on defense of Japan toward an alliance that contributes more 
broadly to international peace and security in East Asia. The 2015 U.S.-Japan 
Guidelines, for example, have embraced this broader vision and make it clear that 
the alliance is important for regional security and the protection of the global 
commons. Because of this shift, the JSDF will be required to conduct combined 
operations with U.S. forces in a manner not contemplated in the 1950s or ’60s. 
On such occasions, the two countries’ distinct interpretations of international 
law and their different ROEs will have to be integrated into operational force 
planning.
Second, the United States and Japan are encountering gray-zone challenges 
that add an additional layer of complexity, as they fall between clearly articu-
lated legal doctrines of peacetime law enforcement and the use of force during 
armed conflict. For Japan, Chinese encroachment on the Senkaku Islands is the 
greatest among these threats. With regard to Japan’s legal system, the concept 
of the gray zone encompasses scenarios that arise before the Diet makes the 
determination of an armed-attack situation, which means the JSDF cannot use 
force in national self-defense; instead, Japan must respond to such situations by 
applying law-enforcement rules on the use of force, which include restriction of 
the use of force to that necessary and reasonable under the circumstances, and 
only as a last resort.
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The United States and Japan will act jointly in a global commons that is 
threatened by states’ use of advanced technology to weaken the bilateral alliance. 
Threats in the cyber domain and outer space can keep the two allies off balance 
and confused, while the conventional land, air, and sea domains are affected by 
disruptive new methods and means of war that upset traditional legal paradigms, 
such as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. While states and scholars 
grapple with these emerging threats through efforts such as the Tallinn Manual in 
cyberspace and the forthcoming Woomera Manual in outer space, the JSDF and 
U.S. armed forces can gain an edge by ensuring greater interoperability and syn-
chronizing their understanding of the law of naval operations.116 The revision of 
the San Remo Manual also is indicative of emerging threats, such as autonomous, 
distributed naval forces, and the Japan Maritime Command and Staff College and 
the U.S. Naval War College have aligned their efforts in this regard.117 Given the 
difficulty in obtaining agreement on international law in these areas, the United 
States and Japan can serve as thought leaders to shape the progressive develop-
ment of international law.
Although the two allies share similar values favoring a free and open interna-
tional order, their histories, cultures, and political systems diverge. The differ-
ences do not affect the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance or its commitment 
to respond to security threats large and small. Therefore, the allies should invest 
more effort into improving legal interoperability and ensuring synchronization 
of integrated operational force planning, to be better positioned to respond to 
contingencies arising in East Asia. This article provides a point of departure to 
achieve greater alliance cohesion.
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